This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country's level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. The latter suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.
Introduction
Terrorism mainly involves attacks on economic or political interests of rich and democratic countries perpetrated by nationals from developing countries (Krueger and Laitin, 2003) . There is thus an important international dimension in terrorism, as most terrorist events relate a target country to a different source country, and that relationship is typically asymmetrical, as the two countries involved have a vastly different level of economic and political development. Often, the terrorist attack takes place in yet another host country, which Drakos and Gofas (2006) call the "venue". Therefore, the target country is not necessarily in a position to defend its interests directly, and must somehow delegate part of its anti-terrorist activity to one or several governments, unless it chooses deliberately to infringe on the latter's sovereignty. This inter-governmental relationship has generally been neglected in the literature devoted to the fight against terrorism. The latter has mainly addressed either the issue of self-protection against terrorist attacks (see Enders and Sandler, 2006) , or that of "crackdown", i.e. various forms of violent interventions. One exception is Azam and Delacroix (2006) who suggest that foreign aid is potentially an important tool for inducing local governments to fight terrorism within their sphere of influence. They bring out an intriguing empirical relationship showing that the aid flow received by a country is positively correlated with the number of terrorist attacks flowing from it, after controlling only for the recipient country's level of income per capita and population size. Furthermore, they provide a simple theoretical analysis and an econometric test showing that the latter relationship is not a structural equation as it provides instead an estimate of an equilibrium locus relating two endogenous variables. This result, as well as the theoretical model used to explain it, suggests that donor countries are actively using foreign aid as a tool in the war on terror. Within that framework, the donor community is allocating aid across countries with a view to providing (among other things) stronger incentives for fighting terrorism to governments facing groups that are more militant. The present paper aims at extending that analysis by presenting a more satisfactory structural-form equation, together with a richer theoretical framework, explaining better the role of aid in the fight against terrorism. It presents some stronger estimates for the role of aid and brings out the significant impact of secondary school enrolment in reducing the number of terrorist attacks by country of origin.
This debate about the role of foreign aid in the war on terror emerged recently at the highest political level. George W. Bush advocated the use of aid as a tool against terrorism in a much cited speech given in Monterrey on March 22, 2002 . He then said: "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror" (cited in Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.119) .
This idea was echoed in various quarters of the U.S. administration, as well as in academia, and some of its implications were drawn for strengthening aid policy. In particular, the Millennium Challenge Account was created as a new tool for channeling aid to poor countries in the wake of that speech. Alan Krueger criticized severely this proposition in an influential op-ed paper published in the New York Times (Krueger, 2003) . The bottom line of his criticism is that poverty does not seem to be the main determinant behind terrorist attacks.
The survey data presented in Krueger and Maleckova (2003) as well as in Krueger and Laitin (2003) show in fact that terrorists from different movements, including the Hezbollah, are predominantly recruited from a relatively wealthy and educated family background. Similarly, the biographies of Al-Qaeda's activists analyzed by Sageman (2004) show that they generally have a high level of education, generally in scientific or technical disciplines. Some other insight on the profiles of terrorists can be gleaned from Bloom (2005) , Reuter (2004) and Stern (2003) . The emerging picture from these different sets of evidence is that terrorists are men and women in their twenties with some post-secondary training, mostly in technical or engineering education. Hence, the microeconomic evidence refutes a simple view that poverty breeds terrorism, because terrorists are not recruited among the poorest segments of their society of origin. A simple reading of these results would suggest instead that wealth and education exert a positive influence on the decision to engage in terrorist attacks. This is used by some as an argument against the use of aid as a tool in the war on terror, assuming that aid is effective in reducing poverty and promoting education. Therefore, this debate is bearing on a fundamental aspect of the relationships between the North and the South, and raises the issue of the continuation of foreign aid at a time when the global fight against terrorism is dominating international relations. The present paper aims at contributing some additional arguments in this debate, using both theoretical and empirical analysis.
President Bush came up with a different line of defense for his views about poverty and terrorism in September 2002. In a New York Times op-ed published on September 11 he wrote: "Poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, corruption and repression are a toxic combination in many societies, leading to weak governments that are unable to enforce order or patrol their borders and are vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels" (cited in Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p.140) . This statement identifies the government as the crucial actor whose behavior creates the link between economic conditions and terrorism. However, his use of the expression "weak government" is somehow ambiguous, and might be misleading. Some empirical findings are in fact undermining that view. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003) have found that repressive states are typical of the countries of origin of the perpetrators in a cross-country regression estimated over the period 1997-2002. Regarding repression as the hallmark of "weak governments" is a deep semantic issue, as one can make a convincing case that strong states don't need repression, and are better equipped for securing civil liberties for their citizens. However, one potential concern with the findings reported in the two Krueger et al. papers just mentioned, showing that civil liberties have a negative impact on the supply of terrorist events, is the endogeneity issue. One could argue that the countries from which a lot of terrorists originate are probably characterized by the presence of highly militant groups, which might in turn lead their governments to adopt a fairly repressive behavior. Frey (2004) argues that the government is in fact facing a trade off between using repressive counterterrorism measures ("the stick") and relying on more social spending for reducing the social support to the terrorists ("the carrot"). More militant groups might in fact care less for social support, especially if they have external sponsors (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006) , thus pushing the government to choose more repressive methods. Hence, the presence of a repressive government and the supply of terrorists might in fact be jointly determined and result both from the same cause, namely a high level of militancy among some groups in the population.
The present paper is drawing two lessons from this debate, namely that a careful analysis of the role of the government is needed for understanding the links between aid and terrorism, and that the endogeneity issue is crucial for a proper empirical diagnosis.
The empirical analysis of the determinants of the number of terrorist events has become a very active field of research. Todd Sandler has consistently pursued this line of research over about two decades with various co-authors, and has published recently a synthesis of his findings (Enders and Sandler, 2006) . These results have mainly brought out the time-series properties of the data on terrorist events, and shown the effectiveness of various protection devices used by the West. They raise the issue of deflection, whereby selfprotection by some countries diverts the flow of terrorist attacks to other countries. Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Krueger and Maleckova (2003) have focused instead on the flow of terrorist attacks originating from different countries and found that the key determinant is the presence of a repressive state in the country of origin. They underplay the role of economic variables, supporting the view that political determinants are more important. Similarly, Testas (2004) focuses on political repression rather than on income per capita, which he finds marginally significant or insignificant, while restricting his sample to Muslim countries. He finds that the impact of political repression on the supply of terrorist events is non-linear, as both low and high levels of repression are affecting the latter positively. However, Azam and Delacroix (2006) suggest that political repression and the supply of terrorist attacks may well be jointly determined, as described above, both responding positively to the unobserved level of "militancy" prevailing in some population groups in the country of origin. The results presented by Testas (2004) also tend to underplay the role of economic variables. However, although terrorists are found in the upper tail of the income distribution, as mentioned above, some empirical studies suggest that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is negatively correlated with shifts of that distribution. Several empirical papers have shown that economic downturns are in fact significant for explaining upsurges of terrorist attacks (Blomberg et al. 2004 , Li, 2005 . Hence, the macroeconomic evidence seems to contradict the findings emerging from individual data. Lastly, Azam and Delacroix (2006) suggest that these analyses suffer from an omitted-variable bias, as Official Development Assistance (ODA) turns out to be significant in their own structural equation. Hence, even if foreign aid was ineffective for raising the recipient's national income or its level of education, it could very well have an impact by some other channels. The present paper offers a possible solution to this problem. Frey et al. (2006) have criticized the standard practice of counting the number of terrorist events for adding up in fact some very heterogeneous events. They argue that evaluating their costs would provide a more relevant measure of the severity of terrorist activity, one that would add up in a more sensible way for computing an aggregate index. In particular, they show empirically that a large part of the social cost of terrorist events is made of non-economic losses. A more lethal event would reduce life satisfaction by a larger amount than a less lethal one, over and above any economic loss experienced by the survey respondents. Hence, a correct measurement of the damage inflicted by the terrorist events would give more weight to the more lethal and violent attacks, and would help focus attention on the most damaging ones. Nevertheless, an empirical analysis of the number of events originating in each country remains a useful task to perform in order to identify the possible policy handles that are available for reducing their flow. The measurement of the social cost of terrorism is probably more relevant for the target country or the host country than for the source country, which is the focus of the analysis presented below. We focus here on the cross-country determinants of the number of terrorist attacks by country of origin.
The individual-level findings described above about the impact of wealth on terrorism also raise a major challenge to economists who want to apply rational choice theory to explain such a behavior. Higher wealth and education increase the opportunity cost of taking risk in perpetrating a terrorist attack, and still do not seem to act as a deterrent in the real world, at least for those who cross the line. Three main arguments have been offered to reconcile this finding with rationality. The first one is based on the assumption of rationing on the volunteers' market. According to this view, there is an excess supply of volunteers for terrorist missions, and the organizations pick the most educated ones, likely to be more efficient than the others. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) has developed this line of analysis, with a model that endogenizes mobilization and violence. His model suggests that policies improving the economic situation, including may be foreign aid, could nevertheless play a favorable part for reducing mobilization and violence. A different argument is used by Azam (2005) , assuming that terrorists are motivated by altruism towards the next generation. People with a lower rate of time preference will invest more resources in education, and will also be more willing to sacrifice their own life for the sake of the future generation. Hence, the effect of education on the opportunity cost of putting one's life at risk might be offset by its positive impact on inter-generational altruism. That model suggests that some types of aid policies might be effective against terrorism, depending on the effect that they have on the trade off facing the potential terrorists. Berman and Laitin (2005) , Ferrero (2006) and Wintrobe (2006) provide a third line of argument, and analyze instead the social pressure dimension of the decision to opt for suicide bombing. More educated people would be more sensitive to some kind of social pressure, especially when they are students living far away from their family.
They then tend to create a closed circle with other students. Sageman (2004) illustrates this phenomenon with examples from Al-Qaeda activists. These models do not involve much implication for aid policy. However, the former addresses the issue of the relationship between wealth and terrorism described above, suggesting that some subtle indirect effects could yield a negative net impact. The latter four papers view suicide attacks as the ultimate test of the rational choice approach to terrorism. The present paper does not address empirically this issue, but the theoretical framework takes due account of these findings that suggest that education might have a positive impact on the value that some activists attach to performing a terrorist attacks.
The next section briefly reviews the literature on the allocation of foreign aid across countries, which suggests that the latter is predominantly determined by political considerations, rather than by the aim to fight poverty per se, despite declarations to the contrary. Section 3 presents the simple model that captures the delegation problem involved in the fight against transnational terrorism. It is aimed at bringing out the roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror. The empirical results are presented in two steps. Section four presents the data used and a simple estimation of the impact of aid and education on the number of attacks originating from each country. Section 5 provides a slightly more sophisticated analysis, aimed at testing whether an endogeneity bias is present in that equation. Section 6 offers some concluding comments.
The Political Determinants of the Allocation of Foreign Aid across Countries
As mentioned above, a careful analysis of the role of the government is needed for understanding the links between aid and terrorism. This is consistent with the theoretical literature on aid, which is largely couched in the framework of the principal-agent model.
There is now a sizable literature discussing various aspects of aid, which has percolated somewhat in the policy debate (e.g. World Bank, 1998) . The basic structure of the theoretical models of aid views the recipient government as the agent of a foreign power, the donor. Both players have some common interest, which is widely assumed to be poverty alleviation, albeit with different weights (Adam and O'Connell, 1999 , Azam and Laffont, 2003 , Svensson, 2000 . Any other common interest could be included in the model, without changing the basic structure. Then, the aim of the analysis is to bring out the implementation problems involved and to discuss solutions that can make aid effective, by the donor's standards. Azam and Saadi-Sedik (2004) go one step further in the analysis by looking at the choice made by the foreign power between giving aid and imposing sanctions. They provide a case study of the fate of the Iraqi Kurds after the "Provide Comfort" operation was launched, i.e. when that group benefited from some protection against Saddam Hussein's persecution. They conclude that it was highly beneficial for this previously victimized group, who benefited from some economic growth under the military shield provided by the allied forces. The model used in section 3 below is a very simple instance of this type of principal-agent models, where the donor is using the recipient government as a delegate for performing some tasks on its behalf.
There exists also an empirical literature on the allocation of aid across developing countries, which takes on board the political economy dimension. Aid to developing countries has been increasingly delivered as program aid, conditional upon the recipient government undertaking various policy reforms. The highly influential paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) has brought out forcefully that the effect of aid must be analyzed while taking due account of some heterogeneity among recipient countries. They favor an index of the quality of macroeconomic policies as their heterogeneity parameter. However, their results suggest that aid-effectiveness, as measured by its impact on growth and development is probably not the crucial determinant of the allocation of aid across countries. Using also cross-country regression analysis, Svensson (1999) shows that aid is more effective in affecting growth in more democratic countries, but is not allocated to the latter more favorably. This also suggests that aid allocation is governed by other considerations. There is thus probably a hidden agenda beside the generous drive to alleviate poverty. This is the issue analyzed by Alesina and Dollar (2000) , who show that colonial past and strategic alliances are the main determinants of the amount of aid received. However, they also show that, in the time series dimension, democratization is often followed by increased aid, although there is no significant static effect of democracy. By contrast, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) find a significant positive impact of the Freedom House index of civil liberty and political right, in a panel data analysis covering the period 1980-1999, for 137 aid recipient countries, and 22 bilateral donors. This is confirmed in a later study, using a different estimation method (Berthélemy, 2006) . Nevertheless, the latter two studies bring out quite strongly that most bilateral donors are also guided by their self-interest for allocating their aid, and in particular by their commercial relationships. Fleck and Kilby (2006a) show that the latter concern plays also an important part in determining the allocation of U.S. bilateral aid across countries, but one that changes with the political orientation of the president. More conservative ones are more influenced by commercial interests than more liberal ones. The results reported by Fleck and Kilby (2006b) suggest that the validity of such a diagnosis can be extended to the case of the World Bank, whose aid-allocation behavior is significantly influenced by U.S. trading and political interests. Here again, however, one may wonder whether trading flows are perfectly exogenous, at least as far as bilateral donors are concerned. Although most of the latter have formally ruled out tied aid, towards the end of that sample period, some implicit and subtle ways of tying aid remain probably in operation.
Moreover, aid helps financing the trade deficit of developing countries, and this is bound to boost the imports from industrialized donors. Hence, some reverse causation between aid and trade might also be at work. Chauvet (2002) looks at the relationship between aid allocation across countries and socio-political instabilities. The latter refers to various events that reflect political problems in the recipient countries. She distinguishes: (i) elite instability, including coup d'etat, revolutions, and major government crises; (ii) violent instability, including political assassinations, guerrilla warfare, and civil wars; and (iii) social instability, including strikes, demonstrations and riots. She shows that these three types of events have different impacts on the allocation of aid, depending also on the kind of aid. Instabilities of types (i) and (ii) have a positive impact, while type (iii) has a negative one. This suggests that the aid flow is somewhat directed at governments that are under political threat, while it shies away from the threats that are directed more specifically at the economy. These results are again providing some support to the view that the donors are giving aid to recipient governments in response to some political motivation, while economic issues seem to play a secondary role. Similarly, Azam and Delacroix (2006) show that the allocation of aid across countries is influenced by the donors' goal of fighting terrorism.
The present paper is also analyzing a political dimension of the allocation of aid across countries, by looking at its relationship with terrorism. Instead of looking at the indirect link between aid and poverty, and then in turn to the additional link between poverty and terrorism, as done in the policy debate mentioned above, we are looking here at the direct link between aid and terrorism.
The Model
Now, we model a donor that allocates aid between a number of countries, which are liable to produce some terrorist attacks against the donor. In each of these countries, the government is able to exert some effort for fighting terrorism, at a cost. Then, aid is a way to defray the recipient government for this cost of effort. The government's action exerts its influence on the value of a terrorist "hit" for the activists, which also depends on some idiosyncratic "militancy" parameter. Hence, for each country, three players are involved: (i) the terrorist group determines the number of attacks perpetrated against the donor, (ii) the local government is exerting some effort to deter these actions, while (iii) the donor provides some aid for compensating the government. This model is an extension of the one presented in Azam and Delacroix (2006) 1 aimed at capturing the choice between the "carrot" and the "stick" as a way of controlling terrorism in the aid-recipient country.
The Three Agents
We capture this framework using the following specification. Denote Y the given income of the donor, A the total amount of aid delivered, and H the total number of terrorist attacks hitting the donor and coming from the different countries. Assume that the donor incurs a cost ( ) H ψ because of these attacks, which is assumed increasing and convex. Now, denote i a the aid given to country
, and i h the number of attacks originating in i .
Then, by definition,
The donor is also assumed to split its aid flow between a general budget support to the government denoted i b and an amount i s which is earmarked for supporting education. The latter captures the social concern expressed by the donor in its relationship with the recipient government. Hence, , 
It is easily checked that this profit function is increasing in its two arguments, reflecting the cost-saving effects of both the local educational capital and the donor's earmarked contribution. Applying Hotelling's lemma, (1) entails that country i 's human capital level may be written as an increasing function of i s and i ε :
(2)
The country's government also incurs a cost ( ) i r ξ (assumed increasing and convex) when performing an amount i r of repression against terrorists, with ( )
Then, the aid contract will specify how much repression is the local government expected to perform against the terrorists within its sphere of influence in return for the aid received, including the earmarked contribution to the education sector. This view of the aid contract captures the idea that the foreign power has to delegate part of the protection of its interests against terrorism to local governments, using aid as a means for defraying the costs of doing so incurred by the local government. In order for this contract to be acceptable by the latter, the triplet { } 
Let i h be the number of attacks perpetrated by country i 's terrorist organization against the foreign power's interests. The terrorist organization attaches a unit value
to these attacks, where i θ is the "militancy" parameter, assumed known to both the donor and the government, and ( ) i v k is an increasing function capturing the positive impact of human capital on the value attached by the terrorist organizations to the attacks perpetrated against the foreign power's interests. This positive effect of human capital on the value of terrorist attacks for the perpetrators is meant to capture the fact mentioned in the introduction that terrorists generally have an above-average education level, as first pointed out by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003) . The terrorist organization is also incurring a cost ( ) , ,
for perpetrating its attacks. This cost function is naturally assumed increasing and convex with respect to i h , and increasing in i r . The impact of i k is less clearcut, and probably combines two opposing effects. There is first a positive impact, as more educated people have a higher opportunity cost, which the terrorist organization will most probably take into account. There is then a second impact going in the other direction, as more educated people are probably more efficient at performing the attacks. The latter effect has been analyzed by Bueno de Mesquita (2005) . However, we do not need to make a firm assumption regarding the marginal effects of repression and education on the terrorist organization's costs, as they do not affect the model's main predictions. The latter only depend on the cross-second derivatives, i.e. the impact of these variables on the marginal cost of perpetrating an attack for the terrorist organization. It is natural to assume that repression increases the marginal cost of perpetrating an attack. Denoting cross-second derivatives by subscripts, this entails 0 hr ω > .
The time line of the game is as follows: (i) the donor offers the aid contract described above; (ii) the government exerts the agreed level of repression and chooses its preferred education level, both assumed perfectly observable and contractible by the two parties; (iii) the terrorists launch their chosen number of attacks i h ; and lastly (iv) the aid is delivered and consumed. Hence, this game can be solved by backward induction. We first derive the terrorist organization's best-response function, as a function of the government's policy variables. Then, the "attacks supply curve" is derived at the country level, by bringing in the government's preferred mix of repression and education expenditures, taking due account of the donor's influence on that choice.
The terrorist organization chooses its level of attacks i h with a view to maximize: 
The signs of the first two partial effects on the left-hand side are fairly intuitive, and do not call for much comment: more militant groups produce more attacks, while a greater repression effort by the government reduces the number of attacks. The third effect is ambiguous, as more human capital increases the value of terrorist attacks while its impact on the marginal cost of these attacks is itself ambiguous, as discussed above.
The Attacks Supply Curve
Now, the donor will choose its preferred aid contract with a view to maximize ( ) (3), which may be written as:
This problem can be decomposed into two steps:
(i) Aid composition problem: the efficient attacks supply curve is determined for each country by minimizing i h , using i s and i r as control variables, given the level of i a , the local government's participation constraint (6) and its preferred education policy (2), and the terrorist organization's best response function 2 .
(ii) Aid allocation problem: the donor's optimal allocation of aid across countries is determined by minimizing
, taking all the efficient attacks supply curves as constraints 3 .
The donor has no reason to leave any positive rent to the local government, and thus (6) will hold with equality. Then, solving simultaneously these three equations allows us to establish proposition 1.
Proposition 1: (i) The number of terrorist attacks originating from country i can be written as the following attacks supply curve:
such that, denoting 0 i λ > the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government's participation constraint:
( ) ( ) 0, 0 and 0
(ii) The donor's optimal allocation of aid across countries is determined by setting: 
and '
with:
Then part (ii) is established by minimizing
( )
A H ψ + , taking all the efficient attacks supply curves as constraints.
A noticeable property of the attacks supply curve, as expressed in (8), is that the signs of the impacts of the educational capital and of aid do not depend on the terrorists' parameters, once (9) is taken into account, but only on the cost functions entering the donor's and the government's objective functions. In particular, the fact that the value attached by the terrorists to the attacks ( ) i v k was assumed above to be increasing in the level of human capital is irrelevant for these predictions. This suggests of course that the observed fact that terrorists have an above-average education level mentioned in the introduction is irrelevant for aid policy. Proposition 1 tells us that even in that case, more educational capital ends up reducing the number of terrorist attacks at the cross country level, because its effect is more than compensated by an adjusted level of repression; for a given aid level, a higher level of educational capital allows the local government to reach its human capital objective at a lower cost, and thus frees some resources for performing more repression 4 . Hence, for some values of the parameters, it is possible that the donor will elicit more repression from the government by earmarking more funding to education
Empirical Analysis
We test the main predictions of the model described above using a similar data set to the one used by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2003) , based on the same source. We thus focus on the number of terrorist events per country of origin of the perpetrators 5 . These data are available on the internet, in the database provided by the (Azam and Delacroix, 2006) .
All these events are transnational in that the target and the source countries are different.
These terrorist attacks are aggregated over the period mentioned above to produce a number of attacks originating from each country during that period. During the latter, the terrorist attacks originated from 80 source countries in our sample, as we have excluded Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cuba, Myanmar, Somalia and Yugoslavia, for lack of some data on the explanatory variables. Thus, we are left with the source countries of terrorist attacks accounting for slightly less than half the 176 countries in our sample. Moreover, there is no compelling argument for deciding whether ODA should be measured per capita or as a ratio to GDP. While the former specification seems to capture better the potential benefits that the country will get from aid, the latter seems more appropriate for measuring the need for it. Consequently, we use both specifications in what follows, showing that the standard econometric procedure for choosing between two non-nested hypotheses is not conclusive in this case. It is less straightforward to find the right measure of educational capital in a comparable way across countries. We have chosen to use the enrolment rate in secondary education in our main equation, but the appendix presents some robustness checks.
This variable is thus liable to be endogenous on two accounts. First, the theoretical model above predicts that the donor will earmark some funds for influencing the decision of the local government to fight terrorism within its sphere of influence through the cost of investing as a check on possible non linearity or a differential treatment for them by the donors. For measuring the level of secondary education, we use the gross enrolment rate, i.e. the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the relevant age group. The resulting ratio can therefore be higher than 100 %. The majority of countries have a gross percentage of secondary school enrolment between 90 and 100 per cent but many countries have a much lower rate, especially in developing countries.
Finally, as emphasized by Azam and Delacroix (2006) , it is very important to try and control for each country's level of militancy in order to identify the correct structural equation for the attacks supply curve. The crucial element of their identification strategy is the sign of the impact of aid, which is negative in the structural equation, while there is a positive correlation across countries if no attempt is made for controlling for militancy. We follow the same route here and use some dummy variables as proxies for capturing this unobserved variable. After a little experimentation, the following dummy variables turned out to be (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) . The latter is less restrictive than the former because it has one more free parameter. The assumed equality of the conditional mean and variance functions is the most restrictive assumption of the Poisson regression model. The negative binomial specification introduces an individual, unobserved effect into the conditional mean. According to this model individuals have a constant but unequal probability of experiencing an event. We use the latter specification, following McCullagh and Nelder (1983) . We tested it against the Poisson model, and concluded that the negative binomial model is always preferred. Therefore, in the following analysis we only present the negative binomial results. Both the theoretical model presented above and the econometric results presented in Azam and Delacroix (2006) conclude that the number of terrorist events per country of origin and the amount of aid are simultaneously determined. However, because it is well known that most methods aimed at correcting for the endogeneity bias are liable to reduce the efficiency of the estimators, we start the analysis by performing the estimations without taking care of it.
In the next section, we then test whether these benchmark estimates are misleading by testing for the presence of a significant endogeneity bias. which turns out to be insignificant. Equation 2 then is estimated while excluding population from the list of explanatory variables. This does not affect much the other coefficients. These equations provide some support to the two maintained hypotheses, as the ratio of ODA to GDP and secondary school enrolment have a significant impact with the predicted sign.
Regarding the other control variables, per capita GDP shows up with the negative sign. This is consistent with casual observation, which suggests that terrorists mainly come from developing countries. As many characteristics of the level of economic and political development are known to be correlated with per capita GDP, one should not infer too much from this result. It does not imply that per capita income stricto sensu is a key factor in explaining the supply of terrorist events. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) have presented a strong argument against such a view. Nevertheless, it is a useful control variable to have, in order to disentangle the effect of foreign aid from that of under-development. Three of the dummy variables included are significant. The West Bank and Gaza dummy variable is an obvious candidate for being used as a proxy for "militancy". The estimates confirm that it is highly significant. The "Camp David" one, which indicates Egypt and Israel, also has a significant positive sign, which is less than 2/3 as high as that for the West Bank & Gaza Strip. Lastly, the dummy variable indicating the OECD countries also has a significantly positive sign, suggesting the presence of a high degree of militancy over the period considered. The importance of these dummy variables is confirmed by running these estimations without them 7 . The results are shown in the appendix, where the equations run without the dummy variables have no significant likelihood ratio tests. Table A.3 presents this result for ODA in percentage of GDP and ODA per capita. Hence, these dummy variables contain some relevant information for identifying our equation, although they most probably fall short of measuring "militancy" with any accuracy.
Using ODA per capita instead of ODA as a ratio to GDP does not affect much the diagnosis, as shown by table 2. The results are qualitatively the same as in the previous case, the same coefficients being significant with the same sign. Hence, we can draw the same conclusion regarding ODA and secondary education, although the latter is only significant at the 10 % level when the insignificant population size is dropped, while it is not significant otherwise. Another difference is that now, it is the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy which is significant, while the OECD one becomes insignificant. Over the period 1990-2004 very few African countries are concerned with terrorism, while socio-political instabilities of another kind are endemic, including coup d'etat, civil wars and riots. One can observe that the majority of countries concerned by terrorist activities were not undergoing a civil war. Hence, both equations lead to the same conclusion, namely that ODA, under both specifications, the secondary school enrolment rate, and GDP per capita are affecting negatively the supply of terrorist events by country of origin. These results shed some light on the lessons drawn from the microeconomic data discussed in the introduction. Even if terrorists are predominantly recruited among the relatively wealthy and educated social strata, as mentioned above, the secondary school enrolment rate and GDP per capita have a negative influence on the number of international terrorist events perpetrated by individuals from each country. This seemingly contradictory result is one of the predictions of the theoretical model presented above, and these empirical results are thus providing some support for the latter.
The overall performance of these equations seems relatively weak, when looking at the pseudo-2 R , but the likelihood ratio tests accept the overall significance of the equations 8 .
Moreover, we tried to choose between the two specifications presented using the J-test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1982) for choosing between two non-nested models.
The idea is that if one model is the correct model, then the fitted values from the other model should not have any explanatory power when estimating that model. The first step is to estimate both models separately. The second step is to use the predicted dependent variable from model 2 as an auxiliary variable in model 1 (and vice versa). The third step consists of re-estimating model 1 and test whether or not the auxiliary variable offers a significant contribution to the explanation of the dependent variable. If this is true, the second model contains some relevant information not contained in the first model. In our analysis, we conclude that none of the two models is preferred. We cannot choose between a model with ODA per capita or ODA in percentage of GDP. Therefore, in the following section, we keep using these two models. Finally, we also performed a number of robustness checks. We use the gross tertiary school enrolment ratio instead of secondary education at table A.3. As mentioned above, the available evidence suggests that most of the terrorists have acquired some post-secondary education. Therefore, testing the impact of tertiary education is potentially an important check on the relevance of the model. The sample size is reduced to 164 countries. The results are qualitatively unchanged. We obtain roughly the same conclusion about the signs of the coefficients and their significance as with secondary education, although its significance level is lower. In particular, it is only significant at the 10 % level when population size is dropped. Therefore, in our sample, the tertiary or the secondary education have roughly the same influence on terrorist activities.
The results of the foregoing section were estimated without correcting for endogeneity, but the next section shows that controling for that does not change significantly the diagnosis.
Controling for Endogeneity
We now test for endogeneity bias, using a version of the Hausman test. This procedure has two stages. First, a reduced-form equation is estimated for each endogenous variable, using exogenous variables as regressors. Then, the resulting residuals are computed and included in the initial model. If the residuals are jointly significant according to an F-test, then there is a significant endogeneity bias in the initial estimates. Moreover, adding these residuals to the equation allows to retrieve the unbiased coefficients, as shown by Blundell and Powell (2003) in a much more general setting.
The Reduced Form ODA Equations
In our setting, we first use the residuals from a Tobit regression explaining the amount of ODA per capita or that of ODA as a ratio to GDP for each country. Indeed, because our sample includes developed and developing countries, while only the latter are receiving any aid, this dependent variable is truncated at zero. In table 3, equation 5 is a reduced form equation aiming at explaining the level of ODA in percentage of GDP with only exogenous variables and equation 6 the level of ODA per capita. We first use some economic variables, namely per capita GDP and population size which explain to some extent the need for aid. We include also a series of dummy variables, aimed mainly at controling for "militancy" and "educational capital", the two exogenous parameters emphasized in the theoretical model.
These dummy variables are also controling for several other country characteristics that might be relevant in the reduced-form ODA equation, like "civilization" and "historical ties" to colonial powers that are liable to affect the allocation of foreign aid across countries. The "China and India" variable helps us to control for any non-linear population size effect.
ASEAN indicates members which joined that organization before 1990. This group represents potentially a "civilization" effect, as do "Latin America & Carribeans", "Sub Saharan Africa" and USSR. OECD and "Camp David" have already been used above for capturing certain "militancy" aspects. In addition, we add the under-5 infant mortality rate as an instrument for educational capital. This is a slow-moving indicator of human capital, which turns out to be significant in the reduced-form education equation. Population and GDP per capita are significant with a negative sign in both equations 5 and 6, in agreement with conventional wisdom, while the infant mortality rate is significant with a positive sign in equation 5 only. Note that the USSR variable is significant in equations 5 and 6 with a negative sign. So, during the period covered here, these countries seem to be discriminated against by the amount of aid received, probably for cold-war related reasons.
Notice also that the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable is not significant in either equation, suggesting that these countries do not get more aid, as a ratio of GDP or per capita, than the rest of the world, after controling for per capita GDP, population size, and infant mortality.
The "camp David" countries, Egypt and Israel, and the West Bank & Gaza strip are getting more aid per capita than the others, given the controls included, but this is not significant when ODA is taken as a percentage of GDP.
Reduced-Form Equation Explaining the Secondary-School Enrolment Rate
To explain the secondary school enrolment rate, we use an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the average ratio of secondary school enrolment over the period 1990-2004. We include the same explanatory variables as in the ODA equation:
population, per capita GDP, under-5 infant mortality rate and dummy variables. The resulting model is globally significant. The population variable has no significant impact on the level of secondary school enrolment, while GDP per capita is significant at the 10 % level only. The infant mortality rate has a negative and highly significant impact, suggesting that health and education seem to be moving in the same direction. Given population size, per capita GDP and infant mortality, OECD and USSR countries have a positive significant impact while the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy has a negative but insignificant coefficient. These signs do not come as a surprise, while the poor but insignificant African performance suggests that the disquieting educational performance achieved in that continent is explained by the control variables included. Table 5 presents the results of the test for endogeneity bias. We add the residuals from equation 5, 6 and 7 in tables 3 and 4, as appropriate, and their estimated coefficients provide estimates of the endogeneity bias for the corresponding variables. We find that the latter is significant for the secondary school enrolment rate and not for ODA, taken individually.
Final Test Controling for Endogeneity
However, the more relevant F-tests for joint significance of the two added residuals confirms the presence of some endogeneity bias, in agreement with the theoretical framework presented above. Furthermore, for each of these variables, the sum of the estimated coefficient and the estimated bias adds up to almost the same number as the estimated coefficients for the same variables in equations 2 and 4, with the exception of the coefficient for Secondary Education in equation 9. This suggests that the addition of the residuals of the reduced-form equations are doing a pretty good job at controling for endogeneity. Then, the estimated coefficients of ODA, either as a percentage of GDP or per capita, and that of secondary education in equation 8, are pretty close to the unbiased estimates. Hence, these results are providing some support to the model presented above. The results of equation 9 are more ambiguous, as the estimated bias for secondary education suggests that the correction for endogeneity is less accurate. Nevertheless, the estimated (unbiased now) coefficient is still negative and significant, thus providing some support also for the model.
Conclusion
The empirical analysis performed in this paper provides some support to the views captured in the theoretical model presented above. This suggests that foreign aid is used (among other things) as a means to induce local governments to fight terrorism within their sphere of influence and thus to protect the political and economic interests of the donors. One of the key benefits of this approach against terrorism is that by reducing the flow of attacks at the source, it creates some positive externalities for the other potential targets. This is at variance with the seemingly more obvious self-protection approach, which creates negative externalities for the other potential targets, by diverting the flow of attacks onto them, as emphasized by Enders and Sandler (2006) . Moreover, the model and the empirical results suggest that the donors can usefully earmark some of that aid for supporting the education sector. The theoretical model presented above helps us to understand why this result does not contradict the evidence found in various statitical data that terrorists are predominantly recuited among people from a relatively wealthy and educated background. What matters for the impact of foreign aid and education on the supply of terrorist attacks per country of origin is their effect on the government's behavior. The fact that there seems to be some correlation between the level of education of the individuals engaged in terrorism and their activism is irrelevant from the donor's point of view, as the local government will adjust its level of repression optimally as a function of the impact of education. Hence, beyond education per se, the model is suggesting that the donor can profitably earmark some funding for some activity that the recipient government values if its contribution is not perfectly fungible.
We thus found that aid can be pretty effective, and this stands in sharp contrast to the received wisdom from the so-called "aid-ineffectiveness" literature, which Easterly (2006) has recently surveyed. Our results thus help redressing the confusion on which that literature is based, namely that aid is deemed "ineffective" because it is not achieving the objectives that it is not really trying to achieve. The proper methodology of economics is rather advocating to infer from the data what objectives are really pursued, in the spirit of "revealed preference" theory. Many rulers of the past have used various means of pleasing local rulers for inducing them to protect their interests within their sphere of influence. The most illuminating example is probably given by the Republic of Venice, which built a trading empire in the Mediterranean world in the late middle ages, between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, while delegating to local rulers, and in particular the Byzantine Emperor, the task of protecting its traders by providing the right incentives as gifts and other advantages. The rich countries of the modern world have walked in their footsteps, on a much larger scale, coining the expression "foreign aid" as the name given to the underlying flow of gifts and presents. The i a s can then be derived implicitly, as (8) and (9) 
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